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Abstract
The current consensus on indirect tax reform in developing countries favors a reduction
in trade taxes with an increase in VAT to raise revenue. The theoretical results on selective
reform that underlie this consensus are, however, derived from partial models that ignore
the existence of an informal economy. Once the incomplete coverage of VAT due to an
informal economy is acknowledged, we show that, contrary to the current consensus, the
standard revenue-neutral selective reform of trade taxes and VAT reduces welfare under
plausible conditions. Moreover, a VAT base broadening with a revenue-neutral reduction
in trade taxes may also reduce welfare. The results raise serious doubts about the wisdom
of the widely implemented indirect tax reform in developing countries.
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Countries
Introduction
Over the last few decades, a general consensus regarding the indirect tax reform in
developing countries has emerged that spans academic economists and policy practitioners
alike. A reduction in the trade tax with a compensating or revenue-enhancing increase
in value-added tax (henceforth VAT) has been the center-piece of such a reform,2 and it
has been implemented in a large number of developing countries under the structural ad-
justment and stabilization policy conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank.3 The
virtues of a consumption tax like VAT are well-known: the elimination of cascading (com-
pared to a turnover tax), and of undue protection to the domestic production of import
substitutes (compared to an import tariﬀ), to mention a couple. The trade taxes, on the
other hand, are, generally, looked upon as doubly distortionary as they interfere with both
consumer and producer prices. There is, however, an important structural feature of a
developing country that militates against the desirability of VAT: the existence of a large
informal sector that escapes the VAT net.4 This implies that while a radial (across the
board) uniform reduction in trade taxes reduces the production distortions and the distor-
tions between tradable and non-tradable sectors, a revenue-neutral radial increase in VAT
2Among few dissenting views, see Anderson (1996, 1999) who shows that it is almost impossible to
ensure welfare improvement from a radial revenue-neutral reform of trade taxes and consumption taxes
when non-tradables are allowed in the model.
3As of April, 2001, 123 countries have some form of VAT. The spread of VAT in developing countries has
been dramatic over the decade of 1990s. In 1969, only one country in Sub-Saharan Africa had VAT. The
number increased to 4 over next two decades. As of April, 2001, there are now 27 Sub-Saharan African
countries with VAT (for a recent discussion of the evolution and spread of VAT, see Ebrill et. al., 2001).
4The informal sector is deﬁned in this paper to be that part of the economy which escapes commodity
tax coverage. It usually includes agriculture, rural non-farm activities (accounted for in the GDP) along
with the so-called shadow economy. The recent estimates show that the average size of the shadow economy
over 1989¡’93 as a percentage of GDP is 39 percent for developing countries and is 12 percent for OECD
countries. When measured in terms of labor force employed in the shadow economy as a percentage of
oﬃcial labor force in 1997 ¡ 98, the average is 50:1 percent for developing countries and 17:3 percent for
OECD countries. In some developing countries like Nigeria and Egypt, the average size of the shadow
economy over the period 1990 ¡ 1993 is 68 to 76 percent of GDP (see Schneider and Enste, 2000).
1increases the inter-sectoral distortions between formal and informal sectors (see Emran and
Stiglitz, 2000a). As a result, contrary to the prevailing consensus, such a reform reduces
welfare under plausible conditions. It casts strong doubts on the validity of the current
consensus regarding indirect tax policy reform in developing countries, when the reform
under consideration is a comprehensive one (radial reform). This, however, leaves open
the question of the desirability of a selective indirect tax reform along the lines frequently
prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank.5 The objective of this paper is to address
this issue by extending the analysis to the case of a selective reform of trade tax and VAT
in an economy with an informal sector. More precisely, we consider a reduction in the
import tariﬀ or export tax on a given commodity (say commodity k) with a revenue-neutral
increase in the VAT on another commodity (say commodity i). The economic costs of a
change in the tax on any given commodity depends on its interrelationships in consump-
tion and production with all other commodities in the economy, both formal and informal.
While a reduction in the trade tax on commodity k reduces the inter-commodity distortions
in both consumption and production relative to all other commodities (including i) in the
economy, a revenue-neutral increase in the VAT on i increases the distortions in consump-
tion, again relative to all other commodities (including k).6 So the logic of inter-sectoral
distortions advanced in Emran and Stiglitz (2000a) in the context of a radial reform is not
as evident in this case.
The concerns of this paper are thus at the intersection of two related issues: (i) the
ineﬃciencies of VAT due to an informal sector, and (ii) the design of selective reform
of taxes and tariﬀs in a revenue-constrained second best world. While there is a large
and mature literature on the piecemeal7 reform of tariﬀs and/or taxes, the ineﬃciencies
caused by the incomplete coverage of VAT due to an informal economy has largely been
5When the tax changes apply only to a subset of the commodities under the tax net, it is called Selective
Reform.
6 A simplistic counting of distortions might suggest that such a reform should unambiguously improve
welfare. However, the number of distortions has no signiﬁcance of its own. It is the relative welfare costs
of distortions created by alternative taxes which should be the focus (Stiglitz, 2000).
7The piecemeal reform includes both a radial (across the board) uniform reform and a selective reform.
2neglected in the literature, with the notable exception of a recent contribution by Piggott
and Whalley (2001). Piggott and Whalley (2001) construct simple numerical examples of
a general equilibrium economy, where a VAT base broadening reduces welfare because of
supply side substitutions toward informal and home production (self supply).8 Results from
calibration of their model to the data from Canada show that the base broadening of VAT
has, in fact, reduced aggregate eﬃciency. Our analysis diﬀers from theirs both in terms
of the questions we address and the models we use. While Piggott and Whalley (2001)
conﬁne their analysis to the implications of an informal sector for a VAT base broadening,
with empirical evidence from a developed country, our focus is on a revenue-neutral reform
of VAT and trade tax in the presence of a large informal economy, particularly in the
context of developing countries. We analyze both a revenue-neutral selective reform of
VAT and trade tax on the existing bases (in the tradition of piecemeal reform literature),
and a VAT base broadening with a revenue-neutral reduction in trade taxes. We assume
that the formal and informal sectors produce diﬀerent commodities (imperfect substitutes),
which is a more general formulation with the assumption of perfect substitutes entertained
by Piggott and Whalley as a special case.
The literature on the piecemeal reform of import tariﬀs (and indirect taxes, in general)
has a long and venerable pedigree. Starting from the seminal work of Bertrand and
Vanek (1971) on the concertina theorem that formalizes an intuition originally due to
Meade (1955), the literature has focused on establishing suﬃcient conditions for welfare
improvement from piecemeal reform of tariﬀs and/or taxes, with and without an active
government budget constraint9 (see Hatta , 1977, 1986; Diewert et al, 1989; Panagariya
8For example, the data show that the share of food budget spent on eating out was reduced to 35%
in 1995 compared to 42% in 1990 when GST ﬁrst covered restaurant meals in Canada. (see Piggott and
Whalley (2001)).
9The government budget constraint is said to be active when a reduction in the revenue due to a
reduction in one tax needs to be balanced by an oﬀsetting increase in another distortionary tax. The
concertina theorem says that, starting from an arbitrary tariﬀ structure, it is welfare-improving to reduce
the highest tariﬀ to the second highest and so on under the assumption of substitutability, when the budget
is balanced passively through adjustments in lump-sum transfers.
3(1992), Michael et al., 1993; Abe, 1995; Anderson, 1999, among others).10 In the face of
diﬃcult ﬁscal predicament of governments in developing countries, and given the evidence
that trade tax reform is likely to result in signiﬁcant loss of revenue11, the objective in the
recent literature has been to devise strategies for reforming taxes and tariﬀs in a way that
both preserves revenue-neutrality and improves national welfare. In the context of selective
reform, Panagariya (1992), for example, addresses the question if a reduction in the highest
tariﬀ rate improves welfare when revenue-neutrality is preserved by increasing the lowest
tariﬀ applicable to imported inputs. Closer to the concerns of the present paper, Michael
et. al. (1993) show that, in a tradables-only economy with no informal sector, a reduction
in the import tariﬀ on the commodity bearing the highest tariﬀ and also the highest total
indirect tax burden increases welfare under suitable assumptions of substitutability, when
the lost revenue is compensated for by an increase in the consumption tax on the commodity
bearing the lowest indirect tax burden. The extant literature, however, completely ignores
the implications of an informal economy for the eﬃciency of consumption tax (VAT) as
an instrument of revenue-raising, which can be especially important in the developing
countries. An assumption critical for the validity and applicability of the existing results
on revenue-neutral selective reform of tariﬀs and consumption taxes is that it is feasible to
impose and collect consumption tax (VAT) on the commodity bearing the lowest indirect
tax on consumption. While this assumption is automatically satisﬁed when an economy
consists of only the formal sector, it is not a plausible assumption in the presence of a large
informal segment in the economy that, by deﬁnition, escapes VAT coverage. In an economy
with both formal and informal sectors, the best one can do is to select the commodity
enjoying the lowest indirect tax burden among the subset of formal commodities as the
candidate for VAT increase. Once this restriction placed by the incomplete coverage of
10In an interesting paper, Lopez and Panagariya (1992) show that it is impossible to satisfy the substi-
tutability assumption underlying the concertina theorem when there are pure intermediate imports (zero
domestic production) in the economy.
11The recent estimates based on CGE models for sixty countries show that trade liberalization reduces
government revenue (see Devarajan et. al. (1999)).
4VAT is acknowledged, we show that there are plausible (suﬃcient) conditions under which
such a selective reform of VAT and import tariﬀ reduces welfare. Consistent with the
numerical results of Piggott and Whalley, we also provide plausible suﬃcient conditions
for worsening of welfare from a reduction in import tariﬀ with a revenue-neutral VAT
base broadening. Also, the extant literature almost exclusively deals with the coordinated
reform of import tariﬀs and consumption taxes, and ignores the case of a coordinated reform
of export taxes and consumption taxes, although such reforms are frequently prescribed
by the policy advisors. Our results on export tax reform in the absence of an informal
sector show that the conditions required for a welfare improvement from the reduction
in export tax on one commodity with a revenue-neutral increase in VAT on another are
much more stringent than the case of an import tariﬀ reform. Unlike the case of an
import tariﬀ reform, the selective revenue-neutral reform of VAT and export tax can reduce
welfare in an economy without an informal sector, even when all commodities are pairwise
substitutable.12 The results of this paper thus complement and strengthen the conclusions
reached by Emran and Stiglitz (2000a) in the context of a radial uniform reform of VAT
and trade taxes: the current consensus about the indirect tax reform is built on fragile
results derived from a partial model that ignores the existence of an informal sector; and
the results from a more complete model demonstrates that such a reform reduces welfare
under plausible assumptions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst section presents the basic model
of the economy. In section 2, we analyze the case of a revenue-neutral reform of import
tariﬀ and VAT. The next section is devoted to the case of a revenue-neutral reform of export
tax and VAT. In each case,we consider both a selective reform and a revenue-neutral VAT
base broadening, and derive suﬃcient conditions for a welfare-worsening reform. The
paper concludes with some remarks about the likely implications of some factors omitted
from the model for the validity of the results.
12The results on the export tax reform without an informal economy reported in this paper are, to the
best of our knowledge, new contributions.
5Section 1: The Model
We build the analysis on a simple model of the economy which has been the work-horse
in the literature on tax and tariﬀ policy reform. The economy, endowed with a vector of
ﬁxed factors (L); is a competitive small open economy. It is assumed that there are no non-
tradable commodities.13 All of the commodities are consumed and produced domestically,
and are also internationally traded. The set of commodities can be partitioned into four
subsets depending on whether a commodity is produced in the formal or informal sector,
and on whether it is an exportable or an importable. We use x for the set of exportables, m
for the set of importables, f for the set of commodities produced in the formal sector, and
s for the set of commodities produced in the informal sector. The set of all commodities,
i.e., the union set of exportables and importables, is denoted as T: The subset xf (xs)
consists of all the exportables produced in the formal (informal) sector. Analogously, mf
(ms) denotes the subset of importables produced in formal (informal) sector.14 There are
some goods which are not taxable. For simplicity, we lump together all the non-taxable
goods into a single good and assume it to be an informal exportable. This non-taxable
informal exportable serves as the numeraire, and is denoted as commodity ‘0’.15 There is
a representative consumer who owns all the factors of production and maximizes a strictly
quasi-concave utility function subject to the budget constraint. Let E(q0;q;U) denote the
expenditure function where [q0;q] is the vector of consumer prices. So E(:) is the minimum
expenditure needed to achieve utility level U facing the consumer price vector [q0;q]. The
production side of the economy is represented by a revenue function G(p0;p;L) which
shows the maximum value of the national output produced with factors L and a convex
13The assumption of a tradables-only economy, although widely used, is undoubtedly a strong one. We
adopt the assumption on two grounds. First, it helps to compare and contrast our results with those
established in the literature. Second, as we discuss later, the inclusion of non-tradables is likely to
strengthen the conclusions reached in this paper.
14We assume that the substitutions induced by a tax reform do not change the status of any commodity,
say from an importable to an exportable.
15As is well-known, such normalization does not impose any restrictions on the set of admissible taxes
only if either the technology is CRTS or there is 100 percent proﬁt tax. As discussed later, we allow for
positive proﬁt that can not be taxed away by government.
6technology when facing the producer price vector [p0;p]. Pure proﬁts, when they exist due
to diminishing returns, are assumed to be untaxed.16 This implies that the assumption
of an untaxed numeraire places restrictions on the set of admissible taxes. G(p0;p;L) is
assumed to be strictly convex in p and strictly concave in L.17 Both the expenditure and
revenue functions are assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable. The government raises revenue
(R(¿;v)) using the trade taxes (¿) and VAT (v). The world prices of all the commodities
are normalized to unity by suitable choice of units. Since the speciﬁc and ad valorem taxes
are equivalent in a competitive model, without loss of generality, we concentrate on speciﬁc
taxes. The price relations in the economy before policy reform are as follows:
q
f = 1 + ¿
f + v p
f = 1 + ¿
f
q
s = 1 + ¿
s = p
s p0 = q0 = 1
where ql is the vector of consumer prices, pl the vector of producer prices, and ¿l is the
vector of trade taxes on commodities produced in sector l, with l = f;s , and v is the
vector of VAT applicable only to the commodities produced in the formal sector.18 For
simplicity, we assume that there are no direct subsidies on consumption, production, or
international trade, implying that vj ¸ 0, 8j 2 f ; ¿j ¸ 0, 8j 2 m ;and ¿j · 0, 8j 2 x.
16For well-known reasons, governments in developing countries can not impose 100 percent proﬁts tax.
For example, it is practically impossible to isolate any pure proﬁt from quasi-rents (the returns to capital
and entrepreneurship) in a typical small unincorporated business in developing countries (see Sah and
Stiglitz, 1992).
17The revenue function is strictly convex in p if there are some substitutability between untaxed numeraire
and the taxed commodities (see Dixit, 1985, p.344).
18One might argue that it should be feasible to collect VAT on the internationally traded portion of the
informal goods also. If it is feasible to collect tariﬀ, it is also feasible to collect VAT on imports. However,
when the competing domestic production in the informal sector can not be taxed by VAT, a tax collected
at the border is, in fact, a trade tax, even if it is collected under the heading “VAT”. This is so because
such a tax drives a wedge between the prices faced by the domestic and international producers and thus
can not be considered a consumption tax. For example, consider the case of rice imports in Bangladesh.
Since rice is produced by numerous small farmers and the bulk of the sales takes place in rural bazaars,
it is not possible to administer VAT on the domestic production. When a tax is imposed on rice imports
and collected at the border, its eﬀect on the domestic producer price can not be neutralized by using an
equal tax on domestic transactions. As a result, the tax collected at the border is really a trade tax, even
though it might be (inappropriately) called a VAT.
7We also assume that all the prices in the economy are positive. The total indirect tax
burden on consumption of commodity j is denoted as ¯j, i.e., ¯j ´ vj + ¿j. where vj = 0
, by deﬁnition, 8j 2 s. The total indirect tax rate as a proportion of consumer price is
denoted as µj, i.e., µj =
¯j
qj .
Assuming that the tax revenue is returned to the consumer in a cost-less lump-sum fash-
ion, the private budget constraint of the representative consumer equates the expenditure
E(q0;q;U) with the private revenue or GNP, G(p0;p;L); plus the tax revenue:
(PBC) : E(q0;q;U) = G(p0;p;L) + R(¿;v) (1)
The government budget constraint is given by the following:
(GBC) : R(¿;v) ´ ¿
0 (Eq ¡ Gp) + v
0Eqf = ¯ R (2)
where the subscripts to the functions E(:) and G(:) denote the partial derivatives, the
prime denotes a transpose of a vector or of a matrix, ¿ denotes the vector of trade taxes on
both formal and informal tradables, and the government is assumed to have a ﬁxed revenue
requirement ¯ R. In addition to the budget constraints of the consumer and the government,
the equilibrium of the economy is characterized by the balance of trade condition which we
can ignore by Walras law. So equations (1) and (2) are the building blocks for analyzing
any indirect tax reform in this economy.
In the tradition of selective policy reform literature, we focus on the following indirect
tax reform: a reduction in the trade tax on one commodity with a concomitant increase in
the VAT on another commodity in a way that leaves total government revenue unchanged.19
More precisely, we consider the following reform: reduce the trade tax (import tariﬀ or
export tax depending on whether it is an importable or an exportable) on commodity k
19In this paper, we assume that all the taxes are on the “right” side of the Laﬀer curve so that a reduction
(increase) in rates reduces (increases) revenue. There are ample evidence that a trade reform is not likely
to be self-ﬁnancing and an increase in other taxes is warranted to ﬁll up the revenue gap (see Devarajan
et al., op. cit).
8(¿k) with a revenue-neutral increase in VAT on commodity i (vi). The eﬀects of such
a reform on the private budget constraint (PBC) and the government budget constraint
(GBC) are as follows:
(Eqk ¡ Gpk)d¿k + Eq
f
i dvi + EUdU = 0 (3)
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dU = 0 (4)
Equation (4) can be rewritten as below to determine the change in vi needed to oﬀset


























i is the marginal eﬀect on the total indirect tax
revenue of a change in vi and Ψk = (Eqk ¡ Gpk)+v
0Eqfqk +¿
0 (Eqqk ¡ Gppk) is the marginal
revenue eﬀect of a change in ¿k: Since we have assumed that both the taxes are on the
“right” side of the Laﬀer curve, it follows that Ψi > 0; and Ψk > 0, if k 2 m; Ψk < 0 if
k 2 x.


























. Observe that q0Eq0U + q
0EqU = EU;
because EU is homogenous of degree one in [q0;q]. Using this, we can rewrite Q as follows:
















9where 1 is a vector of ones of appropriate dimension. Note that the usual assumption









is likely to be negative for distortionary taxation, and
the vector ¿ has both positive (import tariﬀ) and negative (export tax) elements. But
considerations of stability and uniqueness of equilibrium dictates that Q > 0; which we
assume in what follows.20
Given the assumption that the equilibrium is stable, the sign of welfare change dU
d¿k is
determined by the signs of the right hand side of equation (6) along with the sign of Ψk:
A welfare worsening (improving) reduction in trade taxes is implied by dU
d¿k > 0(< 0) if k is
an importable, and by dU
d¿k < 0(> 0) if it is an exportable. So the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a welfare reduction (improvement) is that the right hand side of equation
(6) is positive (negative). Observe that the expressions involved in the right hand side of
equation (6) are the compensated marginal costs of public funds (henceforth CMCF) of
the two taxes under consideration (see Anderson, 2002). 21
The economic eﬀects of a reform of an import tariﬀ are very much diﬀerent from that
of a reform of an export tax. A reduction in an import tariﬀ implies that the subsidy
to domestic producers decreases (pk #), and the consumers beneﬁt as the consumer price
goes down (qk #). A reduction in an export tax, on the other hand, reduces subsidy on
consumption (qk "), but increases domestic production as the producer price goes up (pk ").
This implies that while a coordinated reform of VAT and import tariﬀ has conﬂicting eﬀects
on consumer prices (qk # qi "), a similar reform of VAT and export tax aﬀects consumer
prices in the same direction (qk " qi "). Given this fundamental diﬀerence, the results
diﬀer signiﬁcantly. So these two cases are treated separately. In what follows, we ﬁrst
look at the case of an import tariﬀ reform.
20We are essentially invoking the correspondence principle a
0
la Samuelson here which has been a stan-
dard practice in the literature on tax and tariﬀ policy reform (see, for example, Hatta (1977), Dixit and
Norman (1980), Anderson (1999)).
21These can be viewed as the compensated versions of the social cost-beneﬁt ratios of taxes familiar from
the work of Ahmad and Stern (1984).
10Section 2: Reducing import tariﬀ with an increase in
VAT
In this section, we analyze the case of an import tariﬀ reform accompanied by a revenue-
neutral increase in VAT. From equation (6), a reduction in the import tariﬀ on commodity
k with a concomitant revenue-neutral increase in the VAT on commodity i will be welfare
worsening (enhancing) iﬀ the following holds:
dU
d¿k




i > (<)(Eqk ¡ Gpk)Ψ
¡1
k (7)
What equation (7) says is completely intuitive: a reduction in the tariﬀ on k; ¿k; with
a revenue-neutral increase in the VAT on i; vi; is welfare worsening iﬀ the CMCF of tariﬀ
on k is lower than that of VAT on i. The more important question though is under what
conditions equation (7) is likely to be satisﬁed. We turn to that question in the following.
We ﬁrst analyze the simplest case where all cross-price eﬀects are assumed to be zero.
This can be thought of as an approximation of the case when the cross substitution eﬀects
are negligible relative to the own substitution eﬀects. 22 The basic results, presented below
in proposition (1), can be viewed as extensions of the inverse elasticity rule of optimal
taxation to the case of revenue-neutral tax and tariﬀ reform. Since in this section, we
assume that commodity k is an importable, we have ¿k > 0 and (Eqk ¡ Gpk) > 0.
Proposition 1
(1.a) Assume that the cross price eﬀects are zero, and that there is a positive tax burden
on consumption of i at the initial position. Then there exists a critical threshold such that
if the VAT base of commodity i is smaller than the threshold, the marginal revenue-neutral
reform of import tariﬀ (¿k) and VAT (vi) reduces welfare. The threshold is lower, and
thus a welfare-worsening reform is less likely, if commodity k belongs to the formal sector.
(1.b) Assume that the cross price eﬀects are zero, and that k is an informal importable
22This is the “independent (compensated) demand and independent supply” case widely studied in public
economics (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Myles, 1995).
11with a positive tariﬀ at the initial position. Then there exists a threshold tariﬀ rate ˆ µk ´
ˆ ¿k
1+ˆ ¿k such that 8µk < ˆ µk, a further reduction in the tariﬀ on k with revenue-neutral increase
in VAT on i is welfare-worsening.
Proof
Proof of (1.a)
From equation (6); the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a reduction in welfare can
be written as follows:
Eq
f




> > > > <






















; k 2 s
(8)
Observe that ˆ Eq
f
i > 0 under the conditions stated in proposition (1:a). We have (vi+¿
f
i ) >
0 under the assumption that consumption of i bears a positive tax burden, and vk;¿k > 0;
given the assumption that there are no direct subsidies.23 The last part of proposition
(1:a) follows from observing that the threshold VAT base ˆ Eq
f
i below which the standard
reform reduces welfare is, ceteris paribus, lower when commodity k is produced in the
formal sector, as long as the VAT on it is positive at the initial position, i.e., vk > 0. Even
when the ceteris paribus assumption is relaxed, the conclusion is likely to be valid, as the
consumption level when k 2 f and vk > 0 is necessarily lower due to a higher consumer
price. However, the result is unambiguously valid in this case, only if the strength of own
substitution eﬀects Eqkqk do not decrease at lower levels of consumption. QED
The above result relies on the classic observation that it is costly to raise tax revenue
from a tiny base. The importance of this in the context of VAT in developing countries is
that given the informational and administrative diﬃculties, the VAT base is usually very
small, concentrated on a few large ﬁrms operating in the formal sector. The intuition
23Note that commodity i necessarily bears a positive tax burden on consumption if it is an importable,
given that we preclude any direct subsidies.
12behind proposition (1:a) is as follows. A reduction in ¿k reduces the consumer price qk
and thus increases the domestic consumption of commodity k. If k belongs to the formal
sector, the increased consumption increases government revenue through existing VAT, vk.
But when it is in the informal sector, there is no extra VAT revenue from the increased
consumption of k because by deﬁnition it escapes the VAT net. A simple corollary of the
above result is that, if at the initial position, the VAT is zero on commodity k, then it is
immaterial whether the commodity is produced in the formal or informal sector. Observe
that the last part of proposition (1:a) regarding the sectoral identity of commodity k remains
equally valid, when there are non-zero cross price eﬀects.
Proof of (1.b)
When k 2 ms,we have vk = 0, and qk = pk. In this case, the necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a welfare worsening reform is given by the following inequality:
¿k
1 + ¿k





















is the price elasticity of demand for commodity i, and ¹k ´
(Eqkqk ¡ Gpkpk)
qk
(Eqk¡Gpk) is the price elasticity of import demand for commodity k. Ob-
serve that the right hand side of inequality (9) is positive because ¸i;¹k < 0. So if the tax
rate (ad valorem) on k is small enough the reform reduces welfare.QED
It is interesting to note a special case when the indirect tax rates on k and i are equal
to begin with, i.e., µk = µi. In this case, inequality (9) can be simpliﬁed to the following:
j ¸i j>j ¹k j (10)
So under these conditions, the standard marginal revenue-neutral reform of import tariﬀ
and VAT will reduce welfare if the price elasticity of demand for i is higher than that of
demand for imports of k. The above result is obviously related to the inverse elasticity
13rule of optimal taxation in an open economy (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1974).
The General Case: Non-zero Cross Substitution Eﬀects
We now turn to the more general case where the cross price eﬀects are not zero, and
present an analysis of the revenue-neutral selective reform of tax and tariﬀ in an economy
with and without an informal segment in the economy. We start with the case when there
is no informal segment of the economy, and establish suﬃcient conditions for a welfare
enhancing reform, similar to, but slightly weaker than, the ones previously derived by
Michael et al.(1993). We then turn to the central case: the revenue-neutral tax and tariﬀ
reform in an economy consisting of both formal and informal sectors. The results show
that it is almost impossible to ensure that such a selective reform of indirect taxes will be
welfare-improving when the incomplete coverage of VAT due to a large informal economy
is taken into account. In proposition (3), we show that even with a strong assumption like
universal pairwise substitutability, there are plausible (suﬃcient) conditions under which
the standard coordinated reform of tariﬀ and VAT reduces welfare. This result raises
serious doubts about the wisdom of the widely implemented indirect tax reforms under the
IMF and World Bank’s policy conditionalities. Before presenting the results, we state the
following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions
(a) Consider a set of commodities D µ T with j 2 D. Commodity j is called a substi-
tute in consumption of the compound commodity D¡j consisting of all other commodities
in set D except j , if the following holds:
X
r2D;r6=j
j (¯r ¡ ¯j) j Eqjqr > 0: (11)
where ¯s, as deﬁned earlier, denote the total tax burdens (VAT plus trade tax) on
consumption of respective commodities. For example, ¯r ´ vr +¿r is the total indirect tax
burden on consumption of commodity r.
14(b) Consider a set of commodities D µ T with j 2 D. Commodity j is called a
substitute of the compound commodity D¡j in production, if the following holds:
X
r2D;r6=j
j (¿r ¡ ¿j) j Gqjqr < 0: (12)
Note that pair-wise substitutability in consumption and production are suﬃcient for
compound substitutability, but not vice versa. This also implies that compound substi-
tutability with respect to D¡j does not imply compound substitutability with respect to
any proper subset of D¡j.
The above deﬁnitions are due to Hatta (1986). We extend the deﬁnitions in the
following way. If the inequalities in above deﬁnitions are weak rather than strict, then
we call it weak compound substitutability. Also, when any given commodity is a pairwise
substitute of all other commodities in the economy, both in consumption and production,
i.e., Eqjqr > 0, Gqjqr < 0 8j 2 T and r 6= j; then the commodity r is called a universal
pairwise substitute.24
Proposition 2
(Welfare-Improving Reform of Tariﬀ and VAT)
(2.a) In an economy with no informal segment, it is welfare enhancing to reduce the
import tariﬀ ¿k with a revenue-oﬀsetting increase in the VAT vi, if the following suﬃcient
conditions hold:
(2:a:i) commodity k is a weak substitute of the compound commodity consisting of all
other commodities except k, T¡k; both in consumption and production;
24Throughout this paper, we use the assumptions of compound substitutability when analyzing the stan-
dard case, i.e., an economy with no informal sector. This helps to compare and contrast our results with
the extant literature. While the compound substitutability assumptions are weaker in the sense that they
allow for pairwise complementarity, their dependence on the initial tax structure makes them less attractive
on theoretical grounds. However, the results stated in terms of compound substitutability remain valid
under the assumption of pairwise substitutability, because the later implies the former, but not vice versa.
We use the assumptions of pairwise substitutability which are independent of the tax structure for the
central results of the paper dealing with an economy consisting of both formal and informal sectors.
15(2:a:ii) commodity i is a substitute of compound commodity consisting of all other com-
modities except i ,T¡i , in consumption ;
(2:a:iii) commodity k bears the highest total indirect tax burden (VAT plus tariﬀ), and
also has the highest tariﬀ , and commodity i bears the lowest total indirect tax burden.
(2.b) In an economy consisting of both formal and informal sectors, the conditions
stated in proposition (2:a), if feasible, remain suﬃcient for a welfare improvement.
Proof
When there are non-zero cross price eﬀects, from inequality (7); a welfare-enhancing
reform in an economy consisting of both formal and informal sectors requires that the





























Now using the homogeneity properties of Eqj and Gpj, inequality (13) can be rewritten































































So a reduction in ¿k with a revenue-neutral increase in vi will be welfare enhancing iﬀ
inequality (14) is satisﬁed. This inequality is the key to proposition (2).































A set of suﬃcient conditions that satisfy inequality (15) are as follows: (i) ¯k > ¯j ,
8j 6= k; (ii)¯
f
i < ¯j , 8j 6= i; (iii) ¿k > ¿j; 8j 6= k; (iv) k is a weak substitute of the
compound commodity T¡k both in consumption and production; and i is a substitute of
compound commodity T¡i in consumption. These are the conditions stated in proposition
(2:a) above. Now observe that if there is an informal segment of the economy, equation
(14) can still be collapsed to equation (15) with j 2 T, instead of j 2 f, given that the
indirect tax burden on consumption of an informal commodity is, by deﬁnition, equal to
the trade tax, i.e., ¿j ´ ¯j,8j 2 s. QED
Observe that if (i) k is a substitute of the compound commodity T¡k in consumption
(production), (ii) k is a weak substitute of T¡k in production (consumption), (iii) i is
a weak substitute of T¡i in consumption, they, together with the assumption of extreme
taxes on k and i, constitute an alternative set of suﬃcient conditions for a welfare improve-
ment. Suﬃcient conditions similar to proposition (2:a) were earlier derived by Michael
et. al. (1993), which are, however, over-suﬃcient as they do not allow for weak compound
substitutability.25
The above analysis shows that, formally, the same conditions remain suﬃcient for a
welfare improvement, even when the economy consists of both formal and informal sectors.
One might be tempted to interpret this as an indication of the robustness of the results.
However, the existence of an informal sector compromises the plausibility of these conditions
25In addition, Michael et. al. require that the marginal revenue eﬀects of both the taxes need to be
positive, as we assume throughout this paper.
17in a very fundamental way. It is almost impossible to satisfy the condition that commodity
i bears the lowest indirect tax burden on consumption in the presence of a large informal
sector, as is the case in developing countries. This is due to the fact that i is necessarily
a formal commodity given the assumption that a VAT can be collected on it. In general,
the total indirect tax burden on a formal commodity is higher than that on an informal
commodity because of VAT. The exportables produced in the informal sector are likely
to bear non-positive indirect tax burden because a VAT can not be imposed on them,
and export tax subsidizes their consumption. Thus the informal exportables are the most
likely candidates to bear the lowest indirect tax burden.26 More important, when there are
direct subsidies, as is the case in most of the developing countries, any arbitrary informal
commodity can enjoy the distinction of the lowest indirect tax burden. This severely
restricts the applicability of proposition (2); and renders it largely vacuous. While in an
economy without an informal segment, the commodity with lowest indirect tax burden is,
by deﬁnition, under VAT coverage, there is no guarantee that a VAT can be levied on the
commodity bearing the lowest indirect tax burden when there is a subset of commodities that
escapes the VAT net.27 In this case, the best one can do is to look for the commodity with the
lowest indirect tax burden among the subset of formal commodities as the candidate for VAT
increase. This restriction on the choice of the candidate commodity for VAT increase, while
relevant even for developed countries, assumes a critical dimension in developing countries
where more than half of the GDP originates in the informal economy. As we show in
what follows, in this more realistic case, the standard revenue-neutral selective reform of
import tariﬀ and VAT reduces welfare under plausible (suﬃcient) conditions, even under a
stronger substitutability assumption like universal pairwise substitutability.
26The agricultural exports produced by numerous dispersed small farmers ﬁt into this category.
27Note that commodity k can belong to either formal or informal sector, because a VAT need not be
levied on it.
18Proposition (3)
(Welfare-Reducing Reform of Tariﬀ and VAT With an Informal Econ-
omy)
In an economy with both formal and informal sectors, assume that
(3:a) k is a universal pairwise substitute, and i is a pairwise substitute of all other
commodities in consumption,
(3:b) commodity k bears the highest indirect tax burden on consumption, and also the
highest tariﬀ among all commodities,
(3:c) commodity i enjoys the lowest indirect tax burden among the subset of formal
commodities.
Then a marginal reduction in tariﬀ on k with a revenue-neutral increase in VAT on i
reduces welfare if
(3:i) the indirect tax burden on consumption of i is higher than a (possibly negative)
threshold, and
(3:ii) the VAT base for commodity i is smaller than a positive threshold.
Proof
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for a welfare reduction following a marginal
decrease in ¿k with a revenue-neutral increase in vi is given by the following inequality:
Eq
f
i < ˜ Eq
f





































19Inequality (18) above follows from the assumptions of universal pairwise substitutability
and the highest tax and tariﬀ assumptions for commodity k. It is obvious that, under the




i qj > 0. It immediately
follows that ∆i < 0 , if ¯
f
i is high enough to satisfy the following28:
¯
f













i > ˜ ¯
f
i , we have ∆i < 0 which, in turn, implies that ˜ Eq
f
i > 0: In this case, if
the domestic consumption of i (VAT base) is suﬃciently low to satisfy inequality (16); the
standard revenue-neutral tariﬀ and VAT reform reduces welfare. QED




i qj is lower when
commodity i is a strong substitute29 of the commodities with a net subsidy on consumption.
Under the assumption that there are no direct subsidies, only the exportables can enjoy
subsidies on consumption. Especially ¯j < 0, 8j 2 xs, i.e., the consumption of informal





i qj and hence ˜ ¯
f
i will be low or even negative, if commodity i is a strong
substitute of informal exportables in consumption, but the substitutability with respect to
the commodities with a positive tax burden on consumption is not strong enough. When
direct subsidies are allowed, the consumption of any arbitrary commodity can be subsidized
at the initial position, and one can have a negative ˜ ¯
f
i even if commodity i is not a strong
substitute of informal exportables in consumption. It is also important to note that the
threshold VAT base below which the standard reform reduces welfare is, ceteris paribus,
higher the higher is the value of imports of commodity k at world price (Eqk ¡ Gpk). So it
is more likely to have a welfare reduction when import tariﬀ reform involves a commodity
28Observe that ¯
f
i can be positive and still satisfy the requirement that commodity i bears the lowest
indirect tax burden on consumption among all formal commodities, given that the numeraire commodity
which has a zero tax burden by deﬁnition is assumed to belong to the informal economy.
29Here the term ”strong substitute” is used to denote the strength of substitutability only, and is not
related to the deﬁnition due to Hatta and Haltiwanger (1986).
20that has a signiﬁcant weight in the consumption but a small domestic production.
We now turn to a straightforward but important corollary of proposition (3) above.
One of the central features of the indirect tax reform in developing countries has been the
emphasis on the desirability of base broadening of VAT. But inequality (19) above can
be satisﬁed even when commodity i bears no tariﬀ or VAT at the initial position. This
implies from equation (16) that, if the potential VAT base for commodity i is smaller than
a threshold, a VAT base broadening to include commodity i with a revenue-neutral cut in
import tariﬀ on another commodity will reduce welfare. As we noted in the introduction, a
welfare-worsening base broadening of VAT is not just a theoretical possibility; its empirical
relevance has recently been demonstrated by Piggott and Whalley (2001) in the context of
GST in Canada. If a VAT base broadening is likely to be welfare-worsening in a country like
Canada where the size of the shadow economy is only about one fourth of the average size of
the shadow economy in developing countries, it is a fair conjecture that such a reform will,
a fortiori, be welfare-reducing in developing countries.30 The following corollary states
the conditions for a welfare-reducing base broadening of VAT when the revenue-neutrality
is preserved by cutting import tariﬀ on another commodity.
Corollary 3.1
(Welfare-Reducing Base Broadening of VAT)
Assume that vi = ¿
f
i = 0 and ˜ ¯
f
i < 0 at the initial position, and that conditions
(3:a) ¡ (3:c) of proposition (3) are satisﬁed. Then a tax reform that reduces the tariﬀ on
commodity k and balances the budget by broadening the VAT base to bring commodity i
under the tax net, reduces welfare if the VAT base of i is smaller than a (positive) threshold.
Note that if the tariﬀ on commodity i is positive, but there is no VAT at the initial





i , even if ˜ ¯
f
i > 0.
30The estimate of shadow economy in Canada used by Piggott and Whalley is 10 percent of GDP.
21Section 3: Reducing Export tax with an increase in
VAT
This section is devoted to an analysis of the case where commodity k is an exportable
implying that ¿k < 0 and (Eqk ¡ Gpk) < 0. We explore suﬃcient conditions for a welfare-
worsening or welfare-improving reduction in the export tax, ¡¿k, with a concomitant
revenue-neutral increase in VAT on commodity i; vi. As in the previous section deal-
ing with the case of import tariﬀ, we begin our analysis with the simple case where all
cross price eﬀects are assumed to be zero. An interesting result that contrasts with the
case of an import tariﬀ reform (see proposition (1)), is that , a reduction in the export tax
is more likely to be welfare worsening when it is produced in the formal sector. Proposition
(4) below states the results.
Proposition 4
(4.a) Assume that there are no cross price eﬀects, and that the consumption of com-
modity i bears a positive tax at the initial position. Then a reduction in ¡¿k with a
revenue-neutral increase in vi leads to a reduction in welfare if the VAT base is suﬃciently
small to begin with. It is, ceteris paribus, more likely to have a welfare-worsening reform
when commodity k belongs to the formal sector.
(4.b) Assume that there are no cross price eﬀects, and the consumption of i 2 T; and
k 2 xf bears positive tax at the initial position. Then a reduction in ¡¿k with a revenue-
neutral increase in vi leads to a reduction in welfare irrespective of the relative size of the
tax bases, if the initial export tax is suﬃciently low.
Proof
Proof of (4.a)
When all cross price eﬀects are zero, and k 2 x, from equation (6), the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for an welfare reduction is given by the following inequality:
22(Gpk ¡ Eqk) >
8
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i < 0; and the consumption of i is
taxed. This implies that the terms in brackets in the right hand side have ﬁnite values
irrespective of the sectoral identity of commodity k. So the inequality above is satisﬁed, if
Eq
f
i is suﬃciently small. Now note the implications of the sectoral identity of commodity
k. The term enclosed in brackets in the right hand side of equation (20) is positive, when
k 2 s, as vk = 0; in this case. However, the term is always algebraically smaller for the
case when k 2 f , and can be either positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of
the initial VAT, vk and the own substitution eﬀect, Eqkqk. This implies that it is more
likely to satisfy inequality (20) , and thus to have a welfare-reducing reform, when k 2 f .
QED
The intuition for this result is again simple, and mirrors the result on the implications
of the sectoral identity of an importable commodity discussed in proposition (1) in section
(2) above. A reduction in the export tax reduces the subsidy on the domestic consumption
of the commodity, and reduces the VAT revenue from existing VAT on it, as consumption
suﬀers due to (own) substitution eﬀect. If instead, k belongs to the informal economy,
by deﬁnition, there is no VAT on it to begin with, and consequently, there is no loss in
VAT revenue from lower domestic consumption. So a reduction in the export tax is more
costly in terms of revenue, when the commodity is produced in the formal sector.31 The
policy implication of the above result is that a reduction in export tax on the large scale
manufacturing exports, and agricultural exports produced in plantations needs more careful
scrutiny because of the possible loss in VAT revenue. The reform of the export taxes on
the agricultural exports produced by numerous dispersed farmers that escape the VAT net
31Again, observe that this implication remains valid when we allow non-zero cross substitution eﬀects.
23looks more rewarding, from this perspective.
Proof of (4.b)
The sign of the right hand side of inequality (20) for the case k 2 f depends on the sign
of the numerator which can be either positive or negative. It can be easily veriﬁed that













= 0: So given the any nonzero and ﬁnite consumption
and production substitution eﬀects, there always exists a small enough export tax ¡¿k > 0
such that inequality (21) is satisﬁed. In this case, the right hand side of inequality (20) for
k 2 f is negative, and the inequality is satisﬁed irrespective of the relative size of the tax
bases, and hence the standard marginal reform of VAT and export tax reduces welfare.QED
The General Case: Non-zero Cross Substitution Eﬀects
We now turn to the general case with non-zero cross substitution eﬀects. An important
result here is that, even without an informal sector, the suﬃcient conditions needed to secure
a welfare improvement are much more stringent and ad hoc in this case when compared
to the case of a reduction in an import tariﬀ, as discussed in proposition (2). Unlike
the case of an import tariﬀ reform, a reduction in export tax on k with a concomitant
revenue-neutral increase in VAT on i can be welfare reducing in an economy consisting of
only formal sector under the assumption of substitutability. In what follows, propositions
(5) and (6) report the results for the case where the economy consists entirely of formal
sector so that any arbitrary commodity can be chosen as the candidate for VAT increase.
This is followed by the results on the central case with both formal and informal sectors so
that the search for the candidate for VAT increase is limited within the formal sector.
24Proposition 5
(Welfare-Improving Reform of VAT and Export Tax Without an Informal
Economy)
In an economy without any informal segment, there, in general, does not exist com-
pound substitutability assumptions that can ensure a welfare-improvement from a marginal
reduction in export tax on k with revenue-neutral adjustments in VAT on i. A set of suf-
ﬁcient conditions for such a revenue-neutral marginal tax reform to be welfare-improving is
as follows:
(5:i) commodity k enjoys the lowest and commodity i the second lowest indirect tax
burden on consumption among all commodities;
(5:ii) commodity k bears the highest export tax;
(5:iii) commodity k is a weak substitute, both in consumption and production, of the
compound commodity T¡k, and i a weak substitute of the compound commodity ,T¡k;i in
consumption;
(5:iv) k and i are pair-wise complements in consumption.
Proof
When the export tax on k is reduced with a concomitant increase in VAT on i so that
total revenue remains the same, the following inequality provides us with the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for a welfare improvement:
Eq
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Now note that (¯j ¡ ¯k) > 0; 8j 6= k under the assumption that commodity k enjoys the
lowest indirect tax burden. The fact that k bears the highest export tax implies (¿j ¡ ¿k) >






> 0; 8j 6= i;k because i enjoys the second lowest consumption
tax burden These, coupled with the assumptions of weak compound substitutability in







< 0 which in turn implies that Z3 is positive, when k and i
are pair-wise complements in consumption, as assumed in proposition (5). This completes
the proof of proposition (5).32 QED
Observe the diﬀerence in the choice of appropriate k and i above compared to the
case of an import tariﬀ reform, as discussed in proposition (2). In case of an import tariﬀ
reform, we need to squeeze the two polar tax rates from upper and lower tails of the indirect
tax structure. In contrast, here we need to pick both k and i from the lower end of the
indirect tax structure. This diﬀerence reﬂects the fact that these two cases have diﬀerent
implications for consumer prices. The eﬀect on the consumer price of a reduction in the
import tariﬀ is opposite to that of an increase in VAT; a lower import tariﬀ means a lower
consumer price, while a higher VAT implies a higher consumer price. In case of export
tax reform, the eﬀects work in the same direction; both a reduction in export tax and a
higher VAT increase consumer price. Since, in this case, the tax changes increase consumer
32The suﬃcient conditions for a welfare improvement when i enjoys the lowest and k the second lowest
indirect tax burden on consumption are similar to the ones derived here, as long as complementarity
between k and i in consumption is assumed.
26prices of both k and i , the consumer substitutes away from both of these commodities.
Such substitution eﬀects are likely to have positive revenue implications only when all other
commodities bear higher indirect taxes at the initial position, compared to both k and i.
It is interesting to note a couple of special cases when the compound substitutability
assumptions remain suﬃcient for a welfare improvement. First, consider the case when
there are multiple commodities sharing the distinction of lowest indirect tax burden on







implying Z3 = 0. This makes condition (5:iv) irrelevant. The same logic applies when k
and i are the same commodity, i.e., the reduction of export tax and the increase of VAT are
applied to the same commodity bearing the lowest indirect tax burden on consumption and
the highest export tax. In these special cases, the compound substitutability assumptions
remain suﬃcient for a welfare-improving and revenue-neutral reform of export tax and VAT.
These cases are, however, of limited interest for designing any actual tax policy reform.
One unattractive feature of proposition (5) is that, in general, it is very diﬃcult, if
not impossible, to ﬁnd a pair of commodities, k and i, which simultaneously satisfy the
complementarity condition, and the lowest and second lowest tax burdens assumption.
This signiﬁcantly restricts the applicability of such a reform strategy. However, if we
abandon the complementarity condition, a welfare-worsening outcome is possible when the
revenue-neutral marginal VAT and export tax reform is implemented. Proposition (6)
below provides a set of suﬃcient conditions for such a welfare-reducing reform.
Proposition (6)
(Welfare-Reducing Reform of VAT and Export Tax Without an Informal
Economy)
Assume that (5:i) ¡ (5:ii) of proposition (5) hold, and that
(6:i) commodity k is a weak substitute, both in consumption and production, and i a
weak substitute in consumption of the compound commodity T¡k;i,
(6:ii) k and i are pairwise substitutes in consumption,
27(6:iii) the domestic consumption of i (VAT base) is low enough, and the exports of k
high enough, so that the consumer expenditure on i is lower than the value of exports of
k at domestic consumer price.
Then a reduction in the export tax on k with a revenue-neutral adjustment in VAT on
i is welfare worsening if the the cross substitution eﬀect between k and i is suﬃciently
strong.
Proof
In this case, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a welfare-worsening reform can
be expressed as follows:
Eq
f

































(¿j ¡ ¿k)Gpkpj (27)
and Z2 was deﬁned earlier in equation (24). Now observe that Ω1 and Z2 are non-
negative under the assumptions that both k and i are weak substitutes in consumption of
the compound commodity T¡k;i. The denominator is also positive because ¯
f
i > ¯k and
n






> 0 by assumption (6:iii): So ˆ Eq
f
i qk ¸ 0 . This implies that if k
and i are strong enough substitutes in consumption to satisfy inequality (26), the standard
reform of export tax and VAT reduces welfare.33 QED.
The important point to note about the above proposition is that when the pair of com-
modities under reform are close substitutes of each other but their cross substitutability
with respect to all other commodities is low implying that both Ω1and Z2 are small, then
the standard reform reduces welfare. Again, a smaller VAT base for commodity i makes it
more likely that the reform will reduce welfare. This follows from simple diﬀerentiation
33Note that if ¯
f








> 0. As we already noted, since the VAT base is usually small in develop-
ing countries, it seems plausible that the conditions for proposition (6) will be satisﬁed.
Condition (6:iii) implies that it is more likely to have a welfare reduction when the export
tax reform targets the main export items in a country for which the value of exports in
domestic consumer price will be high.
We now turn to the central case where the economy consists of both formal and informal
segments and consequently the search for the candidate commodity for a VAT increase
is limited within the formal sub-sector. The results, reported in proposition (7) below,
although closely correspond to the results for an import tariﬀ reform reported in proposition
(3) above, there is an important diﬀerence, as explained in the discussion following the
proposition.
Proposition 7
(Welfare-Reducing Reform of VAT and Export Tax With an Informal
Economy)
In an economy with both formal and informal sectors, assume that
(7:a) k is a universal pairwise substitute, and i is a pairwise substitute of all other
commodities in consumption,;
(7:b) commodity k bears the lowest indirect tax burden on consumption among all com-
modities and also the highest export tax, and
(7:c) commodity i bears the lowest indirect tax burden on consumption among the subset
of formal commodities.
Then a marginal reduction in export tax on k with revenue-neutral increase in VAT on
i is welfare-worsening if
(7:i) the indirect tax burden on consumption of i is higher than a (possibly negative)
threshold, and
(7:ii) the VAT base for commodity i is smaller than a positive threshold.
29Proof
In this case, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a welfare reduction following a
revenue-neutral reform of export tax and VAT is given by the following inequality:
Eq
f




Now under the assumption of pairwise substitutability in consumption, ∆i < 0; if the
indirect tax burden on the consumption of commodity i is higher than a threshold, i.e., if
the following inequality holds:
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Note that ∆k > 0 here given the assumptions (7:a) ¡ (7:b): So the right hand side of
inequality (28) is a positive quantity, and the inequality is satisﬁed if the VAT base (Eq
f
i )
is suﬃciently small. QED
Observe that the above inequality is exactly the same as inequality (19) at the end of
the proof of proposition (3). The discussion in page (20) on the likelihood of satisfying the
above inequality remains equally valid here. There is, however, an important diﬀerence
that deserves consideration here. Since it is assumed in proposition (7) that the tax burden
on consumption of k is less than that on i, the above inequality is likely to be rather easily
satisﬁed when k and i are close substitutes in consumption, especially if the substitution
elasticities between i and all other commodities (except k) are low. This is in sharp
contrast to the case of an import tariﬀ reform in proposition (3), where the tax burden
on k is always higher than that on i. Consequently, in case of an import tariﬀ reform, a
higher substitutability between k and i makes it harder to satisfy inequality (19).
30Corollary 7.1
(Welfare-Worsening VAT Base Broadening and Export Tax Reform)
Now observe that propositions (6) and (7) remain valid when at the initial position
commodity i is not under the tax net and total indirect tax burden on it is zero. 34 This
implies that a reduction in export tax on commodity k with a revenue-neutral VAT base
broadening to bring commodity i under the VAT net will be welfare reducing if the conditions
stated in propositions (6) and (7) are satisﬁed.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented an analysis of selective reform of trade taxes and VATs
in developing countries that takes into account the implications of a large informal sector
in the economy. The results are, in general, sobering, and they raise serious doubts about
the validity of the current consensus that favors a reduction of trade taxes, and almost
exclusively relies on VAT as the instrument of indirect taxation in developing countries.
The results on a coordinated reform of import tariﬀ and VAT show that, the incomplete
coverage of VAT due to the existence of a large informal sector renders the results derived
earlier in the literature largely vacuous. When the choice of the commodity for VAT in-
crease is restricted by the existence of a large informal sector, the standard policy reform
reduces welfare under plausible (suﬃcient) conditions. A revenue-neutral selective reform
of export tax and VAT requires extremely stringent assumptions to secure a welfare im-
provement, and may reduce welfare, even in the absence of an informal segment in the
economy. These conclusions run counter to the conventional wisdom that VAT is a better
instrument for raising revenue in developing countries compared to the trade taxes.
The simple model used in this paper, albeit standard in the literature, ignores some
important aspects of economic reality in developing countries. They include existence of
non-tradables and intermediate goods, diﬀerential administrative costs of diﬀerent taxes,
34Note that in this case, the assumption that k bears the lowest indirect tax implies that the consumption
of k is subsidized at the initial position, i.e., ¯k < 0.
31smuggling, and cross-border shopping . We brieﬂy discuss the likely implications of these
factors for the results presented in this paper.
First, the assumption that the economy consists only of tradables, although widely
used, is obviously at variance with the economic reality in developing countries. However,
when extended to include non-tradables, it is likely to strengthen the conclusions of this
paper. When all commodities are tradable, we can pick any arbitrary commodity as the
candidate for trade tax reform. The existence of nontradables imply that the search for
the appropriate commodity for reform of import tariﬀ or export tax has to be restricted
within the subset of tradable commodities. This may not be very restrictive in the context
of an import tariﬀ reform, as most of the nontradables (like public utilities) in developing
countries are either untaxed or enjoy subsidies on consumption. Thus it still seems to be
a reasonable assumption that the commodity bearing the highest indirect tax will be an
importable. The case for a coordinated reform of export tax and VAT, however, becomes
even weaker in this case. In the presence of nontradables with subsidy on consumption,
the assumption that the commodity with the lowest indirect tax burden is an exportable
may not be satisﬁed.35
Second, an analysis of the implications of VAT revenue on intermediate inputs that
remains unclaimed by informal ﬁrms is important. However, it raises a number of issues
that deserve a separate treatment on its own (see Emran and Stiglitz, 2002). We provide
a brief discussion of some of the issues pertinent to the present context. Although there
are well-known reasons to be cautious about taxing intermediate goods for revenue purpose
including production ineﬃciency and ineﬃcient incentives for vertical integration, it might
be desirable to tax the intermediate inputs of the informal sector ﬁrms as an indirect way
of taxing them (Newbery, 1986). It seems especially promising in case of a VAT as the
production eﬃciency is preserved within the formal sector and only the informal sector
35 In the context of radial uniform reform in the absence of an informal economy, Anderson (1999)
and Keen and Ligthart (2002) show that it is much more diﬃcult, if not impossible, to ensure a welfare
improvement, when non-tradables are accommodated in the model compared to the simpler case of a
tradables-only economy.
32ﬁrms pay the input taxes as they are not able to claim the rebates. However, the existence
of unclaimed rebates on VAT on intermediate goods by the informal ﬁrms may in fact
strengthen our results when the exportable (importable) under reform is produced in the
formal (informal) sector, while the converse cases require additional qualiﬁcation(s). Let us
consider the case where k is an exportable produced in the formal sector. A reduction in
export tax increases the producer prices of k that pulls resources away from other sectors
including the informal economy as the production of k expands. This reduces the output
and hence the demand for formal inputs by the informal economy and thus reduces the
VAT revenue from intermediate inputs. So our results on the reform of export tax and
VAT are strengthened when the VATs on intermediate inputs are taken into account. Next
consider the case where k is an importable good produced in the informal economy. In this
case, the net eﬀect of a reduction in the tariﬀ on k on the demand for formal intermediate
inputs by the informal sector is ambiguous, ´ a priori. Because while the production of k
goes down, resources are reallocated to other informal commodities along with the formal
sector. However, the net demand for formal intermediate inputs will decrease if either (i)
most of the resources are reallocated to the formal sector, or (ii) commodity k uses the
formal intermediate inputs more intensively than the average (appropriately weighted) of
the informal sector. This lowers VAT revenue from intermediate inputs and strengthens
our result. Finally, consider the case of import tariﬀ reduction when k is a ﬁnal commodity
produced in the formal economy. The result is a reduction in the production of commodity
k as the tariﬀ protection goes down, and a reallocation of resources to the other sectors
of the economy. In so far as, this reallocation increases the production in the informal
economy, it increases the demand for intermediate inputs, and thus increases the VAT
revenue from formal intermediate inputs subject to VAT (unclaimed by the informal ﬁrms).
However, if this indirect eﬀect is small enough, our result still goes through. The indirect
revenue eﬀect of VAT on inputs is likely to be insigniﬁcant when (i) the VAT on inputs
used intensively by the informal sector is low (or zero, as is the case for agricultural inputs
in most of the developing countries), and (ii) the informal inputs markets are thick enough
33so that informal ﬁrms’ demand for formal inputs is small.
Third, It is well-known that trade taxes enjoy a clear advantage over VAT on account
of administrative costs (see, for example, World Development Report, 1988). In fact,
administrative advantage has been the usual explanation for the pervasive use of trade taxes
in early stages of development (Hinrichs, 1966, Musgrave, 1969).36 The informational
and compliance costs of VAT are likely to be high, especially in developing countries,
because of high rates of illiteracy and scant written record-keeping.37 As the ﬁrms in
developed countries usually keep records for monitoring and for other purposes unrelated
to tax compliance, the marginal compliance costs of VAT are substantially lower (Stiglitz,
1987). There are also evidence of a close link between the lack of record-keeping and tax
evasion, as the detailed case study of Cameroon by Gauthier and Gersovitz (1993) shows.
Fourth, the issue of smuggling and its pernicious eﬀects are largely country speciﬁc; it
depends, among other things, on how porous the border is, and on the eﬀectiveness of the
border monitoring. It is, however, important to recognize that both the trade taxes and
VAT can be vulnerable to smuggling. As noted elsewhere (Emran and Stiglitz, 2000b),
an increase in the import taxes increases the returns to both domestic production and
smuggling, so that the extent of smuggling is constrained by the higher domestic supply
of a commodity. A higher VAT, on the other hand, increases the consumer price but
leaves the returns to the domestic producers unchanged. This implies a higher return
to smuggling relative to domestic production, assuming that the commodity in question
36For a formal model that provides a justiﬁcation for trade taxes based on administrative costs, see Kub-
ota (1998). One can argue that the administrative cost diﬀerential might not be of ﬁrst order importance
for a selective reform. Since we are looking at marginal changes in the rates on existing tax bases, the
administrative costs of such a reform are likely to be small. The considerations of administrative costs,
however, assume critical importance when we consider reduction of trade taxes on existing bases with a
base broadening of VAT, for example, as in corollary 3.1 in section 2 above .
37The recent evidence from cross-country regressions show that, “..all else equal, the VAT yields less
revenue in less literate economies” (Ebrill et. al., 2001, P.47). No formal estimate of the administrative
and compliance costs of VAT in developing countries are available in the literature. The available estimates
for developed countries can, however, be suggestive. The administration costs of a broadly “best practice”
VAT is around $100 per registrant per annum in OECD countries, while the corresponding ﬁgure for
compliance cost is $500 (Cnossen, 1994). For Singapore, the estimated compliance cost is $700 (Jenkins
and Khadka, 1997).
34is an importable. So one would expect an increase in smuggling as some of the import
substituting entrepreneurs, along with others, turn into “smuggler entrepreneurs”. Since
domestic supply is reduced (or at least ﬁxed), the extent of smuggling, in this case, is likely
to be higher compared to the case of an import tax. More importantly, the net eﬀect of
smuggling on the relative eﬃcacy of import tax and VAT can only be determined on a case
by case basis with appropriate empirical evidence. In case of an increase in the VAT on an
exportable commodity, there are no eﬀects on domestic production, and no incentives are
generated for smuggling out of the country. This can be an important advantage in some
African countries where signiﬁcant smuggling resulted from very high export taxation. A
reduction in export taxes also has desirable eﬀects. It reduces smuggling and increases
domestic production, and thus is likely to increase the volume of legal exports, and add
to the export tax revenue. From this perspective, a selective reform of indirect taxes
concentrating on exportables has advantages over a reform focusing on importables.
The issue of cross-border shopping has recently gained prominence in the context of
VAT (see, for example, Spiro (1993) on the eﬀect of GST on cross-border shopping in USA
by Canadian consumers) . In contrast to VAT, trade taxes do not encourage cross-border
shopping, assuming that the customs administration is reasonably eﬃcient.
The results on the selective reform of trade tax and VAT presented in this paper, and the
ones on the radial reform presented recently by Emran and Stiglitz (2000a), together provide
strong grounds for a re-evaluation of the indirect tax reform in developing countries.38 We
are not aware of any empirical work that deals with the issues raised in this paper. The
theoretical results presented here, however, suggest that the existing empirical estimates
(for example, Clarete and Whalley,1987, Anderson, 1996) of social cost-beneﬁt of trade
taxes vis a vis VATs (consumption taxes) should be interpreted with due caution, as they
38See also the analysis of the consumer and producer price-neutral tax reform in Emran and Stiglitz
(2001) where we show that the reform schemes for reducing trade taxes advocated in recent literature (for
example, Hatzipanayotou et. al. 1994) also critically depend on the assumption that there is no informal
sector in the economy.
35do not pay adequate attention to the implications of an informal economy.39 New empirical
work within CGE framework that explicitly incorporates the role of the informal/shadow
economy will be invaluable in informing the tax policy reform in developing countries.
Appendix
Derivation of Inequality (14) :
When there are non-zero cross price eﬀects, from inequality (7); a welfare-enhancing
reform in an economy consisting of both formal and informal sectors requires that the
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Also, observe that Eqk is homogenous of degree zero in [q0;q]; which, by Euler theorem,
























































Note that the right hand sides of equations (30) and (31) include the untaxed numeraire.
This can be done because ¯0 = 0.
39It is interesting to note that, even without an informal economy (which is likely to favor the VAT), the
empirical results of Anderson (1996) show that a reduction in trade taxes with a revenue-neutral increase
in VAT reduces welfare in case of Korea.











Again, note that the right hand side of equation (32) includes the numeraire commodity.
This can be done because ¿0 = 0.
Using equations (30) ¡ (32) in inequality (13) in the text we get the inequality (14) in
the text.
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